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Structural Violence and Organizational Practices: Rethinking Business for Peace

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Keywords:	Business for Peace (B4P), Structural Violence, Peacebuilding, Organized Crime, Organizational Practices
Abstract:	<p>This study examines how businesses engage with structural violence through their everyday organizational practices. Drawing on 32 in-depth interviews with managers from multinational and domestic firms in Mexico, we analyze corporate activities across five domains—institutions, markets, communities, operations, and employees—using the Domain framework (Joseph et al., 2024). These practices are mapped against the three defining characteristics of structural violence: inequality, exploitation, and social injustice. While the Business for Peace (B4P) framework (Katsos & Forrer, 2022) offers strategic guidance, our findings reveal its structural limitations in capturing implementation complexity. We propose an integrated B4P framework that retains its three-phase structure—including the distinction between direct and structural violence—while embedding Phase II in the functionally disaggregated Domain framework. This integration enables a more precise and dynamic account of how peacebuilding unfolds within firms. Our analysis reframes business peacebuilding as an embedded process, shifting the focus from the strategic “what” to the organizational “where” and “how” through which business activities reproduce or mitigate systemic, structural violence.</p>

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4 **1. Introduction**
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6 Structural violence (SV) is a type of indirect violence that stems from societal arrangements
7 that prevent individuals from accessing essential resources and opportunities, creating
8 barriers through political, economic, legal, and cultural systems (Galtung, 1969; 1990).
9 Unlike direct violence that is visible and physical, structural violence is often invisible,
10 frequently being overlooked or normalized as part of life’s challenges. Structural violence is
11 the deadliest form of violence, often resulting in significantly more deaths than direct
12 violence (Lee, 2016). It is termed structural because it results from the way society organizes
13 and allocates its resources, and it is considered violent because it causes harm, including
14 injury and death. As Baron et al. (2019) describe, it “kills slowly and undramatically”
15 compared to the more visible impact of direct violence (Galtung & Høivik, 1971) such as
16 wars and kidnappings.
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19 In Mexico, structural violence is not only persistent but deeply entrenched, particularly
20 among women, Indigenous groups, and informal workers (Loera-González, 2021; Telles,
21 Flores, & Urrea-Giraldo, 2015; Vogt, 2013). These harms are intensified by institutional
22 weakness, impunity, and socio-economic inequality, conditions that make Mexico not only an
23 example of structural violence, but also a valuable case for understanding how violence
24 caused by non-state actors connects to business activity. At the same time, the country
25 remains highly attractive for foreign investment and global supply chains (UNCTAD, 2023),
26 positioning businesses as potential actors in mitigating, rather than reinforcing, structural
27 harm.
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30 Despite growing interest in the role of business in conflict-affected areas, research has largely
31 focused on direct violence, such as armed conflict or physical insecurity. Far less attention
32 has been paid to how structural violence unfolds within and through the everyday activities of
33 firms. The business and peace literature has made important theoretical contributions by
34 identifying corporate strategies for engaging with conflict (e.g., Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019;
35 Oetzel et al., 2009), and more recently, by differentiating between direct and structural
36 violence in a dynamic three-phase framework (Katsos & Forrer, 2022). Yet even this
37 conceptual advance remains limited in its utility for understanding business practice. B4P
38 research tends to operate at a high level of abstraction, offering broad strategic categories
39 (e.g., economic development, partnerships) without examining how these strategies translate
40 into organizational routines. As a result, it often overlooks the institutional embeddedness and
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organizational complexity through which structural violence is both reproduced and potentially challenged.

A promising shift in B4P is offered by the Domain framework (Joseph et al., 2024), which identifies five core domains—institutions, markets, communities, operations, and employees—through which business can interact with peace and conflict dynamics. This framework reorients the analysis from what firms intend to do to how they actually operate, offering a more fine-grained view of the organizational pathways through which businesses engage with violent or unjust environments. However, the Domain framework has not yet been applied to contexts where conflict (and its impacts) takes the form of structural violence—for which harm is not episodic or spectacular, but continuous and normalized through socio-economic arrangements.

This paper addresses this critical gap by empirically extending and comparing the B4P and Domain frameworks in the context of structural violence in Mexico. Drawing on 32 in-depth interviews with managers from both multinational corporations (MNCs) and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we map how business activities intersect with the three defining characteristics of structural violence—inequality, exploitation, and social injustice—as outlined in the B4P model. We then analyze how these business practices are distributed across the five organizational domains identified by the Domain framework. By coding both the direction (positive or negative) and target (SV characteristics) of business practices, we reveal how corporate actions can simultaneously reduce and reinforce harm, depending not only on strategic intent but also on where and how such actions are embedded within the firm.

Importantly, this analysis allows us to contrast empirically the Domain and B4P frameworks. While the B4P model offers guidance through six overarching strategies, it remains abstract and under-specified at the level of organizational implementation. The Domain framework addresses this limitation by shifting the unit of analysis from the “what” of peace to the “how” and “where” within the firm. This enables a more precise evaluation of how peace-related outcomes emerge from business functions such as HR, compliance, governance, or stakeholder engagement. Our analysis thus moves beyond a strategic reading of corporate peacebuilding to show how it unfolds through functionally distributed, often ambivalent practices within the firm.

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This paper makes three contributions. First, it extends the Domain framework into settings of structural violence, demonstrating its distinction and applicability beyond contexts of direct violence. Second, it reveals the structural limitations of the B4P framework by showing how its strategic categories fail to capture variations in implementation and impact. Third, it reframes corporate peacebuilding as an embedded organizational practice, i.e., one that is enacted through the everyday activities of firms, rather than merely selected as a strategic option. Building on this analysis, we propose an integrated B4P framework that combines the strategic intent and evaluative function of the original three-phase model with the organizational specificity of the Domain framework. This synthesis enables a more dynamic, grounded, and context-sensitive understanding of how business practices interact with both direct and structural violence. Taken together, these contributions call for a more structured approach to understanding how businesses navigate and shape environments marked by structural violence.

Thus, the paper invites scholars and practitioners to rethink corporate peacebuilding not merely as a strategic option or reputational choice, but also as an organizational practice with material consequences that are capable of transforming, sustaining, or deepening structural violence in the places where firms operate.

2. Business for Peace

The business and peace field, specifically the B4P literature, has emerged as a key subfield within business ethics and management studies, focused on how business actors can contribute to peace in conflict-affected environments. The early foundational work positioned firms as capable agents of peace, largely through their capacity to stimulate economic development, engage in community-building, and promote governance reform (Fort & Schipani, 2004; Nelson, 2000). Oetzel et al. (2009) expanded this work, proposing five business options —economic development, track-two diplomacy, community engagement, external evaluation, and conflict-sensitive practices—mediated by the level of conflict intensity.

Over time, empirical case studies became the dominant methodological approach in the B4P field. These studies illustrate the diversity and complexity of corporate peacebuilding in practice. For example, research on Iraq (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019), Colombia (Rettberg, 2016), Myanmar (Miklian, Schouten, & Ganson, 2016), Northern Ireland (Hayward & Magennis, 2014), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hoelscher & Rustad, 2019) reveals

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3 how business activities can generate both peace-promoting and conflict-exacerbating
4 outcomes. These accounts highlight the importance of contextual specificity and the
5 heterogeneity of firm-level responses to violence.
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9 However, the B4P literature faces several important critiques. First, even well-intentioned
10 corporate peacebuilding activities can have unintended negative effects. For instance,
11 capacity-building programs may undermine local agency by over-relying on foreign expertise
12 (Joseph et al., 2024). Such “spillover effects” highlight the need to understand internal
13 organizational processes, especially as many firms engage in “unconscious peacebuilding”
14 without fully recognizing their impacts (Fort, 2015; Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019). Second,
15 ethical conduct alone does not guarantee peace. Benefits often flow to elites, reinforcing
16 inequality (Ganson, 2019; Hermes & Lehto, 2021). Some B4P strategies—like track-two
17 diplomacy—are rare in practice and may even support conflict actors through corruption
18 (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019; Miklian, 2019). Similarly, a focus on the rule of law or CSR-
19 driven social cohesion can disrupt local dynamics and intensify violence (Bezzola et al.,
20 2022; Hoelscher & Rustad, 2019). Third, B4P often overlooks intergroup divisions central to
21 conflict. Many firms misclassify these as political rather than business issues, missing
22 opportunities to foster cross-group interaction and reduce bias (Turner et al., 1979; Wright et
23 al., 2017). Without deliberate strategies to bridge social divides, B4P efforts can exacerbate
24 intergroup tensions (Ganson & M’cleod, 2019; Joseph & Van Buren, 2021). Moreover,
25 scholars caution against overly optimistic portrayals of business as peace agents. Miklian and
26 Schouten (2019), for instance, argue that B4P practices often serve symbolic or reputational
27 goals rather than genuine, sustainable peacebuilding, and Joseph and Van Buren (2021) note
28 that non-management scholars in fields such as political science are more skeptical of the
29 peace-positive potential of business than are management scholars. These critiques highlight
30 the need for frameworks that capture the ambivalence of business activity and interrogate its
31 structural underpinnings.
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49 Advancement in conceptual contributions that systematize and extend B4P theorizing and
50 address the limitations of existing frameworks has gained traction in recent years. Katsos and
51 Forrer (2022), for instance, propose a three-phase framework for analyzing business
52 responses to violence. In parallel, Joseph et al. (2024) introduce a domain-based approach to
53 understanding business–conflict interactions. This evolution is marked by increasing
54 theoretical integration, as scholars draw on stakeholder theory (Ganson et al., 2022a),
55 institutional theory (Joseph, Maon, & Berti, 2024), and political corporate social
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responsibility (Scherer et al., 2016) to enrich the conceptual foundations of business-peace scholarship.

In sum, the B4P field has evolved from normative theorizing toward a more nuanced, empirically grounded, and critically reflexive body of literature. This provides ground for introducing analytical tools that can better account for how businesses operate across complex conflict environments, to which we now turn.

3. Two Frameworks: B4P and Domain Approaches

Within this expanding literature, two frameworks stand out in shaping contemporary understanding of business-conflict interactions: the B4P framework (Katsos & Forrer, 2022) and the Domain framework (Joseph et al., 2024).

B4P Framework

The B4P framework organizes business responses to conflict into three phases: (I) the decision to engage or withdraw, (II) the options of strategies to reduce violence, and (III) the assessment of effectiveness. Building on seminal work from Fort and Schipani (2004) and Oetzel et al. (2009), in Phase II, which this study focuses on, Katsos and Forrer (2022) outline the most recent six business strategies for addressing violence: fostering social cohesion, track-two diplomacy, upholding the rule of law, economic development, as well as capacity building, and partnerships which are the two most recent add-ons to the B4P strategies. Katsos and Forrer (2022) refer to these as “options” or “activities.” However, this paper refers to them as “strategies” because each proposed strategy includes various activities that fall under it. Therefore, referring to them as “strategies” better reflects their conceptual role within the framework. These strategies are briefly described below.

First, businesses can enhance social cohesion by fostering trust, reciprocity, and strong social bonds within local communities, thereby contributing to peacebuilding efforts (Jenson, 2010). While some scholars have examined the role of businesses in reducing operational risks through community engagement (Getz & Oetzel, 2009; Oetzel & Getz, 2011), others stressed the importance of incorporating employee voices to promote a strong sense of community (Milliken et al., 2015). Second, track-two diplomacy focuses on unofficial, informal interactions between businesses and conflicting parties in conflict environments, where corporations may act as intermediaries. Examples include studies on NGO partnerships to address conflict causes (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015) as well as direct informal negotiations between conflicting actors mediated by the business (Lieberfeld, 2002; Westermann-Behaylo,

2010). However, track-two diplomacy has also been shown to worsen violence in some cases, particularly in active conflict environments (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019). Third, in the absence of effective state legal frameworks, businesses can promote peace by upholding rule of law principles. By adopting international norms and enforcement mechanisms such as ISO 26000, the UN Global Compact, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Oetzel et al., 2009), businesses can promote the rule of law. Fourth, economic development is considered a cornerstone of peacebuilding within the management literature, as business activities generate economic benefits like profit, social welfare, and employment (Milliken et al., 2015; Anderson, Markides, & Kupp, 2010), which can reduce poverty and mitigate conflict (Joseph, Katsos, & Daher, 2020; Haggard & Tiede, 2011). However, some studies demonstrate how economic development can worsen tensions by distributing the benefits unevenly (Miller et al., 2019). Additionally, the studies that have shown increased economic development to reduce violence have largely only shown correlations and have not established causations (Katsos & Forrer, 2022). Fifth, capacity building involves businesses developing the capabilities of various actors both within and outside the company through activities like employee training, stakeholder engagement, and leveraging expertise, all of which can play a role in combating violence (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019). Finally, partnerships with local stakeholders and institutions offer an alternative to traditional development aid, allowing businesses to collaborate across sectors to address complex societal issues and promote peace (Kolk & Lenfant, 2012, 2015; Baur & Palazzo, 2011).

A significant contribution of this framework is its explicit distinction between direct and structural violence—a first in the B4P literature. Direct violence refers to physical harm such as deaths and kidnappings, whereas structural violence encompasses systemic forms of harm such as inequality, social injustice, and exploitation. Their framework provides a dynamic and typological tool for mapping business efforts to address the causes and effects of violence across these characteristics.

The Domain Framework

In contrast, the Domain framework by Joseph et al. (2024) shifts the analytical focus from strategic intentions to the organizational embeddedness of business activity. Based on a systematic literature review, Joseph et al. (2024) propose the Domain framework, which identifies five organizational domains—Institutions, Markets, Communities, Operations, and Employees—as the primary entry points through which firms engage with conflict dynamics. Each domain is further divided into specific domain categories, which delineate the concrete

types of business activity that can either exacerbate or mitigate conflict. These categories allow for a more granular analysis of how business conduct becomes embedded in, or responsive to, conflict dynamics.

The Institutional domain captures how businesses shape governance and engage with political systems in environments marked by institutional fragility. This includes both internal governance mechanisms and external efforts to influence public authority and societal norms. Categories in this domain include upholding legal norms, anti-corruption measures, lobbying and political CSR, engaging in peace negotiations, and shaping societal norms. Second, the Market domain focuses on how firms influence economic structures, including trade flows, investment decisions, and infrastructural development. It considers how firms construct or disrupt access to markets, and the extent to which their activities foster inclusive economic opportunities. The categories in this domain are opportunities via trade policies, markets and infrastructure, enabling investments, and advancing ecological infrastructure. Third, the Community domain concerns how businesses engage with local populations and shape social dynamics beyond the firm's boundaries. It emphasizes redistribution, partnership-building, and the role of business in meeting basic needs or facilitating social cohesion. This domain includes the following categories: providing goods and services, philanthropy/CSR, promoting communal interactions, technological solutions, and social enterprise initiatives. Fourth, the Operational domain refers to the internal and sectoral practices by which businesses govern their activities and supply chains. It highlights how firms institutionalize responsibility, manage conflict-related risks, and engage in collective norm-setting across industries. Its categories include conflict-sensitive governance, collaborative industry networks, inclusive economic relationships, and defunding conflict actors. Finally, the Employee domain addresses the intra-organizational dynamics that influence inclusion, wellbeing, and reconciliation in the workplace. It considers how employment can serve as a site of dignity, transformation, and peacebuilding. Categories in this domain are sustainable livelihoods, capacity building, employee socialization, and personal transformation.

These five domains and their 22 associated domain categories offer a coherent typology for analyzing business conduct in conflict-affected environments. Rather than offering normative prescriptions, the Domain framework provides a structure for evaluating *where* and *how* business actions in each domain may either mitigate or exacerbate conflict. Its strength lies in its capacity to capture complexity and contradiction in conflict-affected environments,

recognizing that businesses may contribute to peace in one domain while reinforcing conflict in another.

Together, these two frameworks offer distinct but complementary perspectives. The B4P framework foregrounds strategic orientation and emphasizes the typology of business actions. The Domain framework centers on organizational structure and embeddedness, providing a more granular view of how business practices unfold across multiple levels and social relationships.

Although conceptually distinct, the B4P and Domain frameworks substantially overlap in capturing business activities relevant to peacebuilding. B4P strategies—such as Rule of Law, Economic Development, Partnerships, Social Cohesion, Capacity Building, and Track-Two Diplomacy—map on to the five domains of Institutions, Markets, Communities, Operations, and Employees through categories like legal compliance, investment, CSR, and employee development. While B4P offers strategic breadth, the Domain framework provides organizational specificity. This complementarity, as the findings will show, also exposes B4P's limitations in addressing the structural dimensions of violence.

Despite these overlaps, a critical gap persists in the business and peace literature: the systematic differentiation between direct and structural violence, with the latter largely overlooked. Although Katsos and Forrer (2022) acknowledge structural violence, they do not fully theorize how it operates across organizational domains. More broadly, the literature remains focused on either a mix of both violence types, direct violence, or post-conflict recovery, overlooking how businesses may perpetuate or fail to specifically address systemic harm. The Domain framework similarly lacks an explicit distinction between violence types.

Advancing the business and peace agenda thus requires placing structural violence at the center of analysis—not as a contextual backdrop, but as a constitutive element of business-society relations. This study addresses this gap by integrating the B4P and Domain frameworks with empirical data from Mexico. The following section outlines the theoretical foundations of structural violence to support this conceptual shift.

4. Structural Violence

The concept of structural violence, first introduced by Johan Galtung (1969), refers to the systematic ways in which social structures harm or disadvantage individuals and groups by preventing them from meeting basic needs or achieving their full potential. Unlike direct

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violence, which is visible and attributable to specific actors, structural violence is embedded in the social, economic, legal, and political systems that shape everyday life. It manifests through unequal access to healthcare, education, legal protection, political representation, and employment, as well as discriminatory norms and institutionalized exclusion. Structural violence is not an episodic disruption of peace, but a chronic and normalized form of harm often rendered invisible precisely because it is institutionalized.

Structural violence has gained renewed attention across disciplines, particularly in public health, development studies, and critical legal scholarship (Farmer, 2004). However, it remains underexplored in management and organization studies. This absence is notable given that many business activities—particularly in low- and middle-income countries—take place in environments where structural violence constitutes the dominant form of conflict. In such settings, harm emerges not from open warfare but from institutionalized patterns of exploitation, corruption, and impunity. These structures shape how value is extracted, labor organized, and markets accessed. Structural violence is not merely a background condition but a constitutive feature of the environments in which many firms operate. Katsos and Forrer (2022) mark an important step toward recognizing this by incorporating structural violence into the B4P framework. They identify three interrelated characteristics—inequality, social injustice, and exploitation—as core dimensions of structural violence relevant to business.

Inequality stems from structural factors that create disparities among social groups, limiting access to resources and opportunities (Blackburn, 2008). Social injustice, recognized through the U.N. Charter and Human Rights Declaration, focuses on equitable treatment and fair resource distribution (Caravelis & Robinson, 2015). Lastly, exploitation occurs when individuals or groups are unfairly taken advantage of (Zwolinski, 2011), often for the benefit of the powerful (Ho, 2007). Together, these characteristics provide an operational bridge between the abstract concept of structural violence and the empirical realities of organizational activity. Table 1 outlines examples of each SV characteristic followed by an explanation of its business relevance.

SV Characteristic	Examples	Business Relevance
Inequality	Disparities in race, gender, religion, class, ethnicity (Blackburn, 2008)	Discriminatory hiring practices or unequal pay.

Social Injustice	Disparities in education, employment, healthcare, and land rights (Taylor & Francis, 2024; Ho, 2007)	Engaging in unfair resource distribution.
Exploitation	Unfair labor practices, corruption, power abuse for personal gain (Zwolinski, 2011; Ho, 2007)	Low wages or corrupt practices.

Table 1. SV characteristics and their business relevance.

While this typology is useful, it remains analytically limited without a framework that accounts for how such harms are produced, sustained, or challenged across multiple domains of business activity. Structural violence is rarely attributable to a single decision or strategy; rather, it accumulates through everyday practices—whether through wage suppression, lack of grievance mechanisms for employees, complicity in weak regulatory enforcement, or selective community engagement. Understanding business involvement in structural violence requires an approach that moves beyond normative strategies to analyze where and how firms are embedded in structurally violent systems and what they can do to ameliorate their effects.

This study addresses this need by integrating Katsos and Forrer’s typology into the Domain framework developed by Joseph et al. (2024). This analytical move allows for a more systematic examination of how structural violence manifests across the institutional, market, community, operational, and employee domains of business activity. In doing so, the study seeks not only to test the analytical scope of the Domain framework, but also to assess the structural limitations of the B4P approach in contexts where structural violence—not direct conflict—is the central mode of harm.

We turn next to the empirical case of Mexico, a country in which structural violence is endemic and where businesses operate at the intersection of opportunity and harm.

Structural Violence in Mexico

Mexico is among the most structurally violent and institutionally fragile middle-income countries. In 2023, it was ranked the least peaceful country in Latin America (Global Peace Index, 2023), with crime, insecurity, and corruption dominating public concern (Justice in Mexico, 2021). According to the Fragile States Index (2023), trust in state institutions remains low, while organized crime and homicide rates persistently high. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC, n.d.) currently classifies eight active conflicts within the country, encompassing territorial, ideological, and social disputes. While direct violence dominates media narratives, these overt manifestations are rooted in deeper

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patterns of structural violence—operating through persistent inequality, systemic injustice, and institutionalized exploitation (Katsos & Forrer, 2022).

Economic inequality in Mexico is among the most pronounced in the region. The bottom 50% of the population earn just 9% of national income, while the top 10% capture 57%; the wealthiest 1% alone control approximately 60% of total income (Chancel et al., 2022; World Inequality Database, 2021). This extreme concentration of wealth is compounded by uneven access to public services, discrimination in labor markets, and political exclusion. As previous research has noted, economic growth in such contexts does not automatically produce peace; instead, it may consolidate elite power and reinforce exclusionary structures (Miklian, 2017; Musa & Horst, 2019).

The state’s failure to address these underlying governance deficits has enabled the rise of non-state actors who exploit structural vulnerabilities. Drug cartels and organized crime syndicates exert control over territories, economies, and communities—often offering alternative governance structures through coercion, patronage, and violence. At the same time, the Mexican state has been widely criticized for its complicity in rights violations, its militarized response to organized crime, and its inability to ensure rule of law (Freedom House, 2024; World Bank, 2024). Structural violence is thus perpetuated by both state neglect and non-state exploitation.

This issue is not unique to Mexico. Other countries—including Colombia, Myanmar, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—face comparable forms of structural violence, in which formal state institutions coexist with informal systems of coercion and exclusion (Global Organized Crime Index, 2023). However, Mexico’s combination of democratic governance, economic integration, and pervasive structural violence offers a distinctive setting to analyze how businesses engage with, or become entangled in, complex forms of conflict largely wrought by non-state actors. This study uses the Mexican context to examine how firms navigate and potentially contribute to structural violence.

5. Research Design

This study draws on a qualitative, interpretive research design to explore how businesses operating in structurally violent contexts engage across organizational domains and interact with systemic harm. The aim is not to test predefined hypotheses, but to empirically extend and assess the utility of the Domain (Joseph et al., 2024) and the B4P framework (Katsos & Forrer, 2022) in the context of structural violence. This approach is appropriate given the

exploratory nature of the research question and the complexity of the social phenomena under investigation. It is essential for understanding how firms shape, and are shaped by, the structural conditions of violence—an area often overlooked in research.

Mexico was selected as a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of a middle-income country where businesses operate within highly institutionalized systems of inequality, social injustice, and exploitation. The combination of formal political order and informal violence makes Mexico a suitable context for assessing how the Domain and B4P frameworks operate under conditions of “normalized” violence. Furthermore, Mexico’s integration into global markets and its attractiveness for foreign investment heighten the relevance of examining private sector engagement in such environments.

Sample and Data Collection

The study utilized an interview protocol comprising semi-structured questions adapted from Katsos and AlKafaji (2019) and structured questions adapted from Oetzel and Getz (2011), both of which focused on collecting data in conflict contexts. Each interview, conducted by the author, lasted on average about 45 minutes and took place between September 2023 and January 2024. All interviews were held in English and were primarily conducted online via video call, with 15% conducted in person.

In total, 32 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted. All participants were associated with the private sector in Mexico, who were selected through recommendations and a snowball sampling method. The recommendation started with a public university in Mexico, which then expanded through snowball sampling. The participants represented various industries at different management levels. Company characteristics were collected, focusing on industry, size, and international or domestic focus. Approximately 94% of companies are for-profit enterprises while a total of 66% are domestic. The companies were classified into three categories based on the number of employees: small (1-49 employees), medium (50-249 employees), and large (more than 250 employees). Of these, 65% were identified as small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).

Participant characteristics such as gender, age-group, job position, and educational background were also provided. Among all participants, 56% were female and 44% were male, all occupying managerial positions selected for their influence on corporate policies and culture. Of these 32 participants, 30 were Mexican nationals, while one was from Colombia and another from Spain. Nearly half, or 47%, of the participants fell into the 30 to

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39 age group while 19% fell between the age group 40 to 49. All interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and coded using MAXQDA software. Table 2 [see Supplementary Material] provides an overview of the interviewee characteristics.

Data Analysis

Interview data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis following Mayring’s (2000) method of deductive category application. A deductive coding strategy was employed given the study’s aim to empirically examine existing theoretical frameworks rather than generate new grounded theory. The analysis involved methodically assigning text segments to theoretically derived categories, using clearly defined coding rules, examples, and criteria for inclusion.

Stage 1: Mapping Business Activities to Domains (Micro to Meso)

The first stage classified managers’ descriptions of business activities according to the five domains of the Domain framework: institutions, markets, communities, operations, and employees. Within each domain, keywords associated with the domain categories served as deductive codes to capture the entry points through which businesses operate and intervene in their environments (Joseph et al., 2024). Coding began at the micro level by identifying specific actions or experiences reported by managers and traced these to the meso level, where activities reflected broader organizational strategies. Once the activities were coded accordingly, each activity was individually analyzed to address keyword and content relevancy. The business activities were then clustered into a specified activity group. This was done for two reasons: to group similar activities for coherence and understanding as well as to ensure privacy of the participant which would not have been possible due to the specificities of the activities. This created a total number of 58 unique activity clusters across the five domains. This stage is illustrated in Table 3 [see Supplementary Material] whereby the number of business activities identified is shown after the activity cluster in parentheses.

Stage 2: Mapping to Structural Violence Characteristics (Meso to Macro)

In the second stage, business activities were mapped onto the structural violence characteristics defined by Katsos and Forrer (2022): inequality, social injustice, and exploitation. This reverse mapping—starting from organizational responses and tracing upward to macro-level social structures—allowed us to assess which types of structural harm firms were attempting to address. This step operationalizes the move from meso- to macro-level analysis, highlighting how localized corporate activities engage with (or overlook)

systemic social conditions. The coding can be found in Table 4 [see Supplementary Material].

Moreover, in this stage, we examined whether the activity had a positive, negative, or mixed effect on the structural violence characteristic as illustrated in Table 5 [see Supplementary Material]. Importantly, these directional codes do not indicate managerial intent in every case. Positively coded activities were typically described as socially constructive interventions. In contrast, negatively coded activities—though not enacted to undermine peace—were identified by participants as business practices necessary within the Mexican context. These were included in the Domain framework based on functional fit, not normative alignment. Thus, when a negative activity is mapped to a domain category (and subsequently to a B4P strategy), it signals undermining of that category. This analytical approach allows for a more precise assessment of how businesses may inadvertently reinforce or mitigate structural violence through everyday operations.

Stage 3: Overlaying B4P Strategies

The final stage involved coding the identified business activities against the six B4P strategies as illustrated in Table 6 [see Supplementary Material] outlined by Katsos and Forrer (2022): rule of law, track-two diplomacy, economic development, social cohesion, partnerships, and capacity building. This allowed for a structured comparison between observed organizational activities and the strategies proposed by the B4P literature. Importantly, this step served to reveal the structural limitations of the B4P framework by identifying mismatches or gaps between empirical practices and theoretical prescriptions.

The coding logic followed a multi-level analytical structure that mirrors how managers themselves described violence and organizational response: beginning with individual-level observations (micro), moving through organizational practices (meso), and connecting to broader structural dynamics (macro), before being assessed in relation to B4P strategies. This design supports both empirical coherence and theoretical reflection, enabling a critical evaluation of how effectively existing frameworks capture the realities of business conduct in structurally violent environments.

6. Findings

This section presents the empirical findings in three parts. First, we analyze business activities that aim to contribute to the reduction of structural violence, followed by those that

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reinforce or exacerbate structural violence. Each part is structured in two stages: a cross-domain analysis, which identifies broad patterns across the five organizational domains, and a within-domain analysis, which examines the distribution of activities across specific domain categories. These findings are then examined through the lens of the three structural violence characteristics—inequality, exploitation, and social injustice—to identify which types of harm are most commonly addressed or reproduced across the business practices identified. Finally, we compare our results against the six B4P strategies to assess conceptual overlaps, mismatches, and boundary conditions between the Domain and B4P frameworks.

To maintain transparency and methodological clarity, the complete coding table—including all 58 activity clusters, their respective domain categories, direction of peace impact (positive or negative), structural violence characteristic addressed, and corresponding B4P strategy—is provided in Table 3 [see Supplementary Material]. This table serves as a reference point for the analyses presented below.

Business Activities that Reduce Structural Violence

Cross-Domain Analysis

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of business activities that aim to contribute positively to the reduction of structural violence. The findings indicate that the Employee domain accounts for the highest share of constructive interventions (37%), followed by Operations (25%), Institutions (18%), Communities (15%), and Markets (4%).

[Insert Figure 1]

This distribution suggests that businesses primarily engage in peace-promoting activities through the internal social organization of work, as demonstrated by the Employee domain (37%). The predominance of employee-related initiatives indicates that firms perceive their workforce as the most accessible and controllable site for social impact. Activities such as fair compensation, gender equity, inclusive hiring, and employee wellbeing were commonly referenced, suggesting that companies are more inclined to address structural violence through individual-level empowerment and organizational culture change rather than through broader socio-political engagement. This pattern aligns with prior scholarship (Slim, 2012; Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019) suggesting that firms often default to internal functions for responsible practice.

The Operations domain (25%) similarly reflects a pragmatic orientation, where firms adapt governance and security practices to conflict-affected environments. Here, businesses engage

in due diligence, enforce safety protocols, and implement operational restrictions, often as part of broader risk management strategies. While these actions may not directly target macro-level injustices, they serve to institutionalize conflict-sensitive practices and promote organizational resilience in volatile contexts.

In contrast, the Institutions (18%) and Communities (15%) domains received comparatively less emphasis. This finding suggests a more limited engagement with external governance structures or local social systems. While some firms reported engaging in anti-corruption efforts, collective advocacy, or healthcare provision, these actions were less prevalent—pointing to the challenges firms face in navigating political or communal complexity. Moreover, the relatively low share of peace-oriented activities in the Markets domain (4%) indicates that firms rarely view market-making or trade policy engagement as a means of addressing structural violence. This underrepresentation is notable given the economic roots of inequality and exploitation, suggesting either that the transformative potential of business in reshaping market access and economic infrastructure (1) remains underutilized or (2) it remains utopic as firm capabilities and their self-preserving nature hinder them to do so.

In practice, businesses tend to concentrate their efforts in domains where agency is high and legitimacy is less contested. The findings suggest that while firms may contribute meaningfully to reducing structural violence within their immediate organizational boundaries, broader systemic change through institutional, market, or community transformation remains limited.

Within-Domain Analysis

To complement the cross-domain analysis, we conducted a within-domain breakdown of peace-promoting business activities. This reveals how firms allocate their efforts across domain categories, providing insight into which types of activities are emphasized relative to others within each domain. The results point to clear strategic preferences and also highlight areas where certain theoretically relevant categories remain underutilized or utopic in the context of Mexico.

Within the Employee domain—the most represented domain—activities are relatively balanced across the four categories, with a slight emphasis on Employee Socialization (34%), followed by Sustainable Livelihood (28%), Personal Transformation (24%), and Capacity Building (14%). Firms appear to prioritize shaping inclusive norms, ethical behavior, and employee wellbeing, as well as addressing exploitation and inequality through promoting

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intergroup inclusion, organizing social events, and team building. The emphasis on employee socialization reflects a view of the firm as a moral community, where organizational culture as well as protecting core and proximately close stakeholders plays a key role in enabling or inhibiting structural peace.

That said, the relatively lower focus on formal capacity building implies a more normative and interpersonal approach than a skill-based one—highlighting peacebuilding through values and integration more than capacity training. This may be partially influenced by the collectivist nature of Mexican culture, which tends to prioritize harmony, relationality, and communal belonging within organizations (Hofstede, 2001). However, this finding warrants critical reflection. While firms may articulate commitments to interpersonal and value-driven initiatives through well-intended ethical conduct, they may still lack the concrete mechanisms (Cechvala & Ganson, 2024) and/or the elite often capture the economic benefits (Ganson, 2019; Hermes & Lehto, 2021). Thus, without a stronger commitment to capability-building, these normative approaches may mask, rather than resolve, the underlying inequities embedded in workplace structures.

In the Operations domain, Conflict-Sensitive Governance accounts for a striking 85% of all activity. This includes due diligence, safety protocols and operational restrictions with evolving security needs in conflict-affected regions. Such a concentration reveals a risk-assessment logic (Ganson, 2014; Jamali, & Mirshak, 2010), where peace-promoting actions are largely geared toward protecting business continuity rather than proactively engaging with conflict drivers. Other categories such as Collaborative Industry Networks (9%), Inclusive Economic Relationships (3%), and Defunding Conflict Actors (3%) are marginal. This suggests that firms seldom collaborate at the industry level to promote peace or challenge criminal economic control collectively. The data imply a siloed and reactive orientation, wherein companies manage their own exposures to violence rather than pursuing sector-wide or transformative solutions.

This reluctance to engage in collective action may be a result or combination of (1) intergroup division and (2) low levels of institutional and interpersonal trust in Mexico (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2021; OECD, 2024), which can inhibit cooperation across firms and industries. Intergroup divisions among firms are often classified as political rather than business issues, hindering cross-group interactions among firms (Wright et al., 2017). Meanwhile, when trust in both state and in organizations is fragile, firms may perceive joint

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3 initiatives as risky, ineffective, or easily undermined—further reinforcing individualized,
4 defensive approaches to navigating violence.
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7 In the Institutional domain, Upholding Legal Norms (46%) and Anti-Corruption Measures
8 (33%) dominate, whereas Shaping Societal Norms (8%) and Lobbying/Political CSR (13%)
9 are less prominent. We note that Engaging in Peace Negotiations is entirely absent. This
10 pattern suggests that institutional engagement tends to focus on compliance and risk
11 avoidance rather than on normative agenda-setting or political agency. Firms may be
12 reluctant to engage in more visible or contested forms of institutional change, particularly in
13 conflict-affected regions (Bray, 2009). While the business and peace literature emphasizes
14 activities such as transparency (Fort & Schipani, 2004) and norm-building (Oetzel et al.,
15 2009), the empirical reality in Mexico reflects conservative, rule-based engagement rather
16 than transformative institutional participation.
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19 Within the Communities domain, Philanthropy/CSR (50%) is the dominant approach of
20 engagement, followed by Promoting Communal Interactions (30%) and Providing Goods and
21 Services (20%). No activity was recorded under Technological Solutions or Social Enterprise
22 Initiatives. This demonstrates the continued reliance on traditional, transactional approaches
23 to community engagement. While philanthropic (e.g., charitable donations) and service
24 provision (e.g., access to healthcare) efforts may yield local benefits, the lack of systemic or
25 collaborative initiatives suggests that businesses are not yet using their full capacity to
26 address the root causes of structural violence within communities. This raises important
27 questions about the depth and sustainability of corporate-community interventions in contexts
28 of endemic inequality and exclusion.
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31 The Markets domain remains the least utilized overall (six activities), with Market and
32 Infrastructure (50%) as the most engaged category, followed by Advancing Ecological
33 Infrastructure (33%) and Opportunities via Trade Policies (17%). No activity was found
34 under Enabling Investments, a category that theoretically holds high relevance for promoting
35 economic development (Joseph et al., 2024). The overall limited engagement in the Markets
36 domain indicates that Mexican firms do not perceive markets as key transformative or
37 peacebuilding instruments, despite the theoretical potential of inclusive market-making and
38 infrastructure investment to address structural violence. The underuse of this domain
39 highlights a critical limitation: economic transformation remains more aspirational than
40 operational in current business practice within Mexico.
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This within-domain analysis clarifies where corporate peacebuilding in Mexico is concentrated, what types of strategies are privileged, and which theoretically important areas remain underdeveloped or utopic. The overall pattern reveals five insights: (1) a strong internal focus on employee norms and safety, (2) a reactive approach to operational exposure to violence, (3) a limited willingness to engage in political or institutional transformation, (4) a continued reliance on philanthropy in community engagement, and (5) a near absence of market-level interventions despite their structural relevance.

These insights reinforce the conclusion that while businesses contribute to reducing structural violence, their interventions tend to cluster in domains and categories where agency is high, and political risk and contestation is low. This highlights the need to reconsider how business and peace scholarship operationalizes conceptual frameworks, particularly in contexts characterized by high levels of violence driven by organized crime and non-state actors.

Having examined how business activities are distributed across organizational domains and categories, we now turn to how these practices interact with the core characteristics of structural violence.

Structural Violence Impact

Table 7 reveals that an analysis of positively coded business practices aiming to reduce structural violence are not evenly distributed across the three SV characteristics. Instead, interventions are concentrated around social injustice, with comparatively less emphasis on inequality and exploitation, depending on the organizational domain in question.

	Institutions	Markets	Communities	Operations	Employees
Social Injustice	69%	86%	70%	91%	34%
Inequality	-	-	30%	-	54%
Exploitation	31%	14%	-	9%	12%

Table 7. Percentage of Business Activities that Reduce SV

Social injustice emerges as the most widely addressed form of structural violence, with the highest share of activities across most domains: 91% in Operations, 86% in Markets, 70% in Communities, and 69% in Institutions. These efforts are primarily directed through compliance systems, employee safety initiatives, public-private infrastructure investments, and community development programs. The prominence of social injustice reflects firms’ greater proximity to issues of institutional failure and unequal access to basic protections and services, particularly in contexts of weak state and governance presence.

Inequality is addressed mostly within the Employees domain, where it accounts for 54% of positively coded activities. This includes actions such as inclusive hiring, gender equity programs, and intergroup socialization efforts. In the Communities domain, 30% of activities also address inequality, typically through educational outreach or promoting inclusion networks. Notably, inequality is not targeted at all in Markets, Operations, or Institutions, suggesting that business practices aimed at redistribution and recognition are largely confined to internal and community-facing initiatives. This signals a limitation in how firms engage with broader systemic hierarchies beyond the organizational perimeter.

Exploitation, while addressed in all domains, receives the least emphasis overall. It accounts for 31% of activities in Institutions, 14% in Markets, 12% in Employees, and just 9% in Operations. These activities typically relate to fair compensation, anti-corruption practices, and ethical conduct. The relatively low engagement with exploitation may reflect either a normalization of extractive practices or a strategic de-emphasis on labor and supply chain inequalities that are more difficult to transform. The complete absence of exploitation-reducing activities in the Communities domain is particularly striking, suggesting that firms do not perceive community engagement as a domain through which to address extractive or predatory dynamics. This may stem from concerns about the efficacy of such interventions or fear of retaliation.

Overall, while business practices aimed at reducing structural violence are diverse, they cluster around addressing social injustice, particularly in domains linked to institutional access, safety, and procedural fairness. Efforts to combat inequality and exploitation are more selective and domain-specific, largely emerging from within the organizational boundaries of the firm or from specific compliance-oriented institutional actions. These patterns point to the importance of disaggregating business practices by SV characteristic and domain to uncover both strengths and blind spots in corporate contributions to structural peace.

Having examined how firms contribute to the reduction of structural violence across domains and SV characteristics, we now turn to the second part of the analysis: business activities that reinforce structural violence. This next section explores how certain practices—while often routine or unintentional—can exacerbate inequality, exploitation, and social injustice.

Business Activities that Reinforce Structural Violence

Cross-Domain Analysis

As illustrated in Figure 2, the Institutions domain accounts for 41% of all negatively coded activities, followed by Operations (28%), Employees (13%), Communities (10%), and Markets (8%). The dominance of the Institutions domain (41%) suggests that business practices embedded within weak governance and regulatory frameworks are particularly prone to undermining peace, supporting existing research (Bray, 2009). This includes complicity in corruption, non-compliance with legal obligations, and enabling criminal economic control—activities that weaken the rule of law and reinforce exploitation or social injustice.

Operations (28%) is the second-most represented domain, suggesting that how firms govern their risk environments can either reinforce or mitigate violence. The fact that negative practices are also present in the domains Employees, Markets, and Communities—though to a lesser extent—indicates that no domain is immune from reinforcing structural harm. This highlights the importance of analyzing not only *what* firms do, but *how* they do it and with what systemic effects.

[Insert Figure 2]

Within-Domain Analysis

Within Institutions, Anti-Corruption Measures account for 69% of negatively coded activities. These include passive or active complicity in bribery and non-transparent financial relationships, signaling that corporate actors may become entangled in governance failures rather than challenging them. A further 19% of activities fall under Engaging in Peace Negotiations, while 13% are associated with Upholding Legal Norms, indicating that even the mechanisms intended to ensure legality can be undermined in practice. This pattern reveals a central tension: while strong institutions and upholding the rule of law are a core pillar in business and peace literature, its operationalization is often undermined by the very firms meant to uphold it—either due to survival imperatives and self-preservation (Boele et al., 2001; Miklian, 2019; Penh, 2009) or due to the normalization of corruption in weak-state environments such as that in Mexico.

Within the Operations domain, Conflict-Sensitive Governance comprises 73% of the negative activities. This includes unjust dismissal practices, security outsourcing without accountability, and informal adaptations to criminal threats. While framed as organizational

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3 pragmatism, these actions often reproduce unequal access to justice, safety, and employment.
4 For example, informal or opaque security arrangements may protect the firm in the short term
5 but violate human rights and strengthen repressive regimes (Banfield, Haufler, & Lilly, 2005)
6 as well as question their moral legitimacy (Elms & Phillips, 2009) as compared to public
7 security institutions. The remaining 27% fall under Defunding Conflict Actors, particularly
8 through coerced payments. For example, paying a monthly quota (*derecho de piso*) to
9 organized crime groups is often necessary to maintain operational functioning (Banfield,
10 Haufler, & Lilly, 2005). These practices highlight how economic coercion blurs the boundary
11 between victimization and complicity. Consequently, the Operational domain becomes a
12 double-edged sword: it is where risk to the business associated with direct violence is
13 managed, but also where structural violence may be normalized and reproduced through
14 passive or defensive business decisions.
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16 All business practices within the Employee domain fall under Sustainable Livelihood,
17 accounting for 100% of the domain's negative activities. These include underpayment and
18 compensation disparities, denial of benefits, and exclusion from formal protections, which
19 reinforce both exploitation and inequality. The absence of negative practices in the other
20 categories—Capacity Building, Employee Socialization, and Personal Transformation—
21 suggests that Mexican firms' harm to employees is concentrated in material working
22 conditions, not in normative culture or leadership domains. This supports the idea that
23 exploitation often occurs not through overt hostility but through routine, normalized HR and
24 compensation practices, reflecting systemic drivers of structural violence in the labor market.
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26 In the Communities domain, all negative activities fall under Providing Goods and Services,
27 specifically withholding or limiting access to healthcare due to informal labor practices. This
28 points to an overlooked mechanism of harm: denial through omission. Lastly, in the Markets
29 domain, all negative activities are found under Market and Infrastructure, reflecting failures
30 to invest equitably or provide security in marginalized areas. These omissions signal a lack of
31 inclusive economic vision, reinforcing spatial and economic inequalities that lie at the heart
32 of structural violence.
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34 Following the domain-level mapping, we now consider the extent to which these business
35 activities contribute to structural violence.
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Structural Violence Impact

When examining the share of negatively coded business activities across domains, distinct patterns emerge regarding which structural violence characteristics are most frequently reinforced within each domain. These patterns, illustrated in Table 8, shed light on how firms, often unintentionally, reproduce inequality, exploitation, and social injustice through their day-to-day practices.

	Institutions	Markets	Communities	Operations	Employees
Social Injustice	19%	33%	100%	70%	0%
Inequality	13%	0%	0%	0%	40%
Exploitation	69%	67%	0%	30%	60%

Table 8. Percentage of Business Activities that Reinforce [SV](#)

Exploitation is the most frequently reinforced characteristic across the majority of domains. It accounts for 69% of harmful activities in Institutions, 67% in Markets, 60% in Employees, and 30% in Operations. These figures suggest that businesses often reproduce extractive dynamics—particularly through practices such as complicity in corruption, unequal pay, denial of benefits, or responding to extortion demands. These patterns indicate that institutional failure and labor informality are central vectors through which corporate conduct contributes to structural harm. The high percentage in the Employees domain also highlights how internal practices—such as underpayment or precarious employment—can exacerbate exploitation, even when firms frame themselves as responsible employers.

Social injustice appears most acutely in the Communities domain, where 100% of negatively coded activities reinforce it. This reflects exclusionary outcomes, such as denying communities access to services, neglecting security, or displacing social resources for corporate benefit. High proportions of social injustice are also present in Operations (70%) and Markets (33%), where firms may fail to ensure fair treatment, transparent procedures, or basic protections. In Institutions, nearly one in five harmful practices (19%) reproduce social injustice, often through non-compliance with legal norms or passive accommodation of criminal actors. These findings highlight how procedural harm and institutional exclusion are embedded in multiple organizational layers, particularly where firms interface with external stakeholders or public systems.

Inequality is less frequently reinforced overall but stands out in the Employees domain, where it accounts for 40% of harmful practices. This suggests that firms continue to sustain disparities in opportunity and recognition, particularly through exclusion from decent work,

gendered barriers, or lack of inclusive policies. Although Institutions show some contribution to reinforcing inequality (13%), this element is absent in Markets, Communities, and Operations, indicating that inequality may be more often reproduced internally than through external engagements.

In sum, the data reveal that each domain reinforces structural violence in distinct ways. Institutions and Markets are particularly associated with exploitation and systemic failure, Operations with social injustice, and Employees with a dual pattern of exploitation and inequality. These differentiated patterns suggest that corporate harm is not incidental or isolated, but rather structurally situated within specific business functions. Understanding where and how firms contribute to structural violence is critical for moving beyond surface-level corporate responsibility narratives and toward more accountable and peace-sensitive organizational practice.

B4P Strategies vs. Domain Framework

This final section contrasts the Domain framework with the B4P strategies to evaluate how each conceptual model captures the role of business in addressing structural violence. While both frameworks provide useful entry points, our empirical analysis reveals substantial differences in analytical precision, organizational traceability, and strategic utility. These differences highlight the limitations of the B4P framework and highlight the added value of the Domain framework in capturing the *how* of corporate peacebuilding. Table 9 provides an overview of this comparison.

At first glance, many activities coded in the data appear to align conceptually with the B4P strategies. For example, all actions under Upholding Legal Norms map cleanly to Rule of Law, and Providing Healthcare in Conflict Regions aligns directly with Economic Development. However, as one moves from domain to category to activity level, a more complex picture emerges. The same B4P strategy is often tied to highly divergent practices. For instance, Economic Development encompasses both redistributive practices (e.g., fair compensation, inclusive hiring) and extractive or harmful ones (e.g., denying health access, operational withdrawal), depending on *how* the activity is carried out. This variability reveals that the B4P strategies are content-rich but implementation-agnostic—they describe the “what” without differentiating the “how.”

In contrast, the Domain framework disaggregates activities by organizational function, offering a clearer view of where and how peace-promoting or peace-undermining practices

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originate. This matters analytically and practically: a strategy like Partnerships may look identical in the B4P model whether it refers to public-private infrastructure or NGO engagement. But in the Domain framework, the former would appear under Markets and the latter under Communities, each tied to different operational logics and potential risks.

Perhaps the most consequential insight from this comparison is the difference in orientation between the two frameworks. The B4P framework is strategy-driven, focusing on what firms can do to promote peace (e.g., build partnerships, foster social cohesion, promote economic development). This offers a valuable high-level vision but remains detached from how these strategies materialize inside firms. Meanwhile, the Domain framework is operationally grounded. It shows where in the firm peacebuilding is enacted—through HR policy, supply chain decisions, compliance systems, or community outreach—and reveals variation in intent, scope, and impact. For example, activities coded under Employee Socialization range from promoting intergroup inclusion to modeling ethical behavior; both fall under Social Cohesion in B4P, but they differ meaningfully in purpose, audience, and execution. The Domain framework exposes these nuances, allowing researchers and managers to trace strategic intent to actual organizational behavior.

Taken together, our findings suggest that while the B4P framework is helpful for categorizing peace-related intentions, it lacks the granularity needed to distinguish between divergent practices that fall under the same label. The Domain framework, by contrast, provides both analytical precision and managerial relevance by tying activities to recognizable business functions. This allows scholars and practitioners to move beyond abstract strategy to understand how peacebuilding is operationalized, where it is embedded, and which organizational logics it follows.

Moreover, the Domain framework’s disaggregation of negative effects—something the prior B4P scholarship has do not explicitly accounted for—exposes important blind spots. Without organizational anchoring, B4P may overestimate the coherence or effectiveness of certain strategies and understate the risk that ostensibly peace-oriented practices may reproduce harm.

Framework Feature	B4P Framework	Domain Framework
Strategic Orientation	Strategy-focused (the “what”)	Structure-focused (the “how”)
Level of Analysis	Macro (cross-sector strategy)	Meso/micro (organizational practice)

Organizational Anchoring	Low: does not map directly to business functions	High: linked to functional areas of the firm
Treatment of Negative Impacts	Implicit or absent	Explicit
Implementation Guidance	Limited: broad categories with high abstraction	Strong: ties strategies to concrete organizational behavior
Managerial Relevance	Abstract: less directly usable by managers	High: supports diagnosis, planning, and accountability

Table 9. Comparison between B4P and Domain Frameworks

This comparison reveals that while the B4P framework defines the normative horizon of corporate peacebuilding, the Domain framework provides its structural map. Moving from “what businesses can do” to “how they actually do it” is essential if peacebuilding is to be understood not merely as a matter of intention but as a question of institutional design, decision-making, and daily practice.

7. Discussion

This study began with a core question: how do businesses contribute to or mitigate structural violence through everyday organizational practices? Drawing on Galtung’s (1969, 1990) theory of structural violence as well as Katsos & Forrer’s (2022) three characteristics of structural violence, we explored how corporate conduct in Mexico engages with these dynamics. By empirically applying and comparing the B4P and Domain frameworks, we sought not only to deductively trace the effects of business activity on structural violence, but also to clarify where inside the firm peacebuilding is made possible or undermined.

The findings reveal a complex picture. Business activities that aim to reduce structural violence are most concentrated in the Employee domain, suggesting that firms primarily target peacebuilding efforts internally—where managerial control is highest. Conversely, Operations and Institutions emerge as ambivalent spaces. That is, while some activities in these domains promote operational safety and compliance, others reinforce corruption, exclusion, or coercive economic arrangements. These patterns reflect precisely the kind of invisible, normalized harm of structural violence in that it is not marked by overt, physical conflict, but quiet, routinized inequalities embedded in business-as-usual conduct.

The comparison between B4P strategies and the Domain framework reinforces this point. While B4P offers strategic categories focused on what businesses can do to promote peace, it lacks the conceptual tools to identify how those strategies are embedded—or distorted—within firm-level operations. The Domain framework, by contrast, surfaces the organizational

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embeddedness of violence and peacebuilding alike. It shows that the firm is not merely a passive actor reacting to external violence, but rather an active site and vector of structural violence.

Following this, we demonstrated that there is a conceptual advantage of the Domain framework (Joseph et al., 2024) over the more widely applied B4P strategies (Oetzel et al., 2009; Katsos & Forrer, 2022). While the B4P strategies provides a valuable model of peace-oriented goals, it lacks organizational anchoring. As our comparative analysis shows, the same B4P strategy can be associated with highly divergent activities depending on where in the firm it is implemented and how it is operationalized. The Domain framework addresses this gap by shifting the analytic lens from “what businesses can do” for peacebuilding to “how and where they actually do it” within the firm. It reframes peacebuilding not simply as a strategic choice or normative intention, but as a functionally distributed and embedded organizational practice. By disaggregating peace efforts into domains and categories, the framework enables scholars to trace the specific pathways through which firms can reduce or reproduce structural violence.

However, this does not render the B4P framework obsolete. On the contrary, we argue that Katsos and Forrer’s (2022) dynamic three-phase B4P model can complement the Domain framework (Joseph et al., 2024) by introducing a temporal and strategic dimension often absent in organizationally grounded analyses. Specifically, Phase I of the B4P framework—whether firms choose to engage or withdraw from conflict regions—adds an important layer of strategic discretion that precedes any operational response. Phase III, which focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of business practices, extends the analytical lens beyond implementation to assessment and accountability. In this integrated view, the B4P framework brackets the peacebuilding process: Phase I captures the strategic entry decision, Phase II outlines possible domains of engagement, and Phase III evaluates impact. We propose substituting B4P’s Phase II with the Domain framework, which offers a more precise and functionally disaggregated account of how peacebuilding is enacted within firms. This substitution enhances explanatory clarity and avoids the abstraction and overlap that characterize the original B4P framework. Critically, this integrated model should also preserve one of the B4P framework’s key conceptual contributions: the explicit distinction between direct and structural violence. Retaining this separation is essential for assessing the varied forms of harm that businesses may address—or inadvertently reproduce—through their operations. While the Domain framework offers depth in organizational mapping, it

benefits from this violence typology to contextualize the normative stakes and conflict dynamics surrounding business activity.

Turning to practical implications, the integrated framework offers meaningful guidance for practitioners navigating conflict-affected environments. While the B4P framework provides strategic orientation, and the Domain framework offers organizational specificity, their combination enables both high-level and functionally grounded decision-making. For managers, Phase I prompts reflection on the strategic question of whether to engage or withdraw; Phase II (via the Domain framework) identifies where and how peace-related practices are enacted within the organization; and Phase III supports the assessment of their effectiveness. This layered structure helps firms navigate complex environments marked by both direct and structural violence, allowing them to tailor responses to the specific form of harm present.

Importantly, the integrated framework [see Appendix A] introduces functional traceability—a means of linking strategic intent to concrete actions across the peacebuilding efforts. Rather than broadly stating support for “economic development” or “partnerships,” managers can identify how these goals are being operationalized, whether through infrastructure investments, inclusive hiring, or collaborative networks. Coupled with the explicit distinction between direct and structural violence, this framework enhances both internal coherence and external accountability. It allows stakeholders to assess not only what firms claim to do, but how—and with what effects—those claims are substantiated in practice.

8. Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations that warrant consideration. This study focuses solely on Phase II of the B4P framework (Katsos & Forrer, 2022), analyzing how firms operationalize peace strategies. While this enables in-depth analysis via the Domain framework, it omits strategic discretion (Phase I) and outcome evaluation (Phase III). To address this, we propose an integrated B4P model in which the Domain framework replaces Phase II, while retaining Phases I and III. Future studies should test this dynamic framework across different contexts. Second, our findings are based on managerial perceptions rather than causality, limiting claims about actual impact. Longitudinal research could trace how peace practices evolve and influence conflict dynamics over time. Third, while grounded in the context of Mexico, the findings are relevant to similar contexts shaped by organized crime and weak institutions. Scholars should test the applicability of the Domain framework in other regions affected by

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criminal or insurgent violence. Finally, future research should investigate how firms navigate the tensions between short-term survival and long-term peacebuilding. Comparative studies across sectors may reveal sector-specific constraints or opportunities for contributing to peace. In addition, further theorization is needed to understand the interplay between direct and structural violence in shaping business conduct, and to identify the conditions under which firms move from reactive to proactive peace strategies.

9. Conclusion

By integrating the B4P and Domain frameworks, we have provided a novel analytical approach that moves research on business and peace from strategic intent to operational reality. Our findings reveal that corporate contributions to peace are unevenly distributed across organizational domains, with efforts concentrated in areas of high managerial control and low political contestation. While the Domain framework offers superior organizational precision, the dynamic B4P model brings strategic framing and evaluative structure. We therefore proposed an integrated framework that preserves the B4P model’s three-phase logic—particularly its distinction between direct and structural violence—while embedding Phase II in the functionally disaggregated Domain model. This integration advances both theoretical coherence and practical relevance, enabling a more nuanced understanding of corporate agency in conflict-affected environments. Ultimately, this study contributes to the business and peace literature by reframing peacebuilding not as a discrete strategy, but as a complex, embedded organizational process shaped by institutional context, managerial discretion, and structural constraint.

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
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For Peer Review

Appendix A






Figure 1_Cross-Domain Analysis-Reduce SV
100x59mm (150 x 150 DPI)




Figure 2_Cross-Domain-Reinforce SV

103x63mm (150 x 150 DPI)

Supplementary Material

Table 2. Interviewee Characteristics by Industry, Size, Location, Position and For-Profit Status.

#	Industry/ type	Size	Primary business location	Position/ Level	For-Profit?
1	Agriculture	SME	Domestic	Owner; CEO	Yes
2	Consultancy	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
3	Government	MNC	Domestic	Manager	No
4	Hospitality	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
5	Information Tech.	MNC	International	Manager	Yes
6	Manufacturing	SME	International	Owner; CEO	Yes
7	Waste management	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
8	Commercial; service	SME	Domestic	CEO	Yes
9	Finance	SME	Domestic	n/a	Yes
10	Textile	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
11	Manufacturing	SME	Domestic	CEO	Yes
12	Agriculture	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
13	Healthcare	SME	Domestic	Doctor	Yes
14	Finance	n/a	International	Manager	Yes
15	Logistics	MNC	International	Senior Executive	Yes
16	Finance	MNC	Domestic	Manager	Yes
17	Manufacturing	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes
18	Beverages	SME	Domestic	Manager	No
19	Hospitality/ Tourism	SME	Domestic	Owner	Yes
20	Hospitality	SME	Domestic	Owner	Yes
21	Legal	MNC	Domestic	Lawyer	Yes
22	Energy	n/a	International	Manager	Yes
23	Healthcare	MNC	Domestic	Manager	Yes
24	Logistics	MNC	International	Senior Executive	Yes
25	Manufacturing	SME	Domestic	Director	Yes
26	Logistics	MNC	Domestic	Director	Yes
27	Chemical	MNC	International	Manager	Yes
28	Healthcare	n/a	International	Director	Yes
29	Healthcare	MNC	International	Director	Yes
30	MedTech	SME	International	Director	Yes
31	Ads/ Marketing	SME	Domestic	Director	Yes
32	Healthcare	MNC	International	Senior Executive	Yes
33	Commercial	SME	Domestic	Manager	Yes

Note: Company size is measured by employee size. SME if < 249; MNC if > 250

Table 3. Coding Scheme of Primary Data

Domain	Category	Activity Cluster	SV	B4P	
Institutions	Upholding legal norms	(+) Internal Compliance Systems (11) (-) Undermining complying with tax obligations (2)	Social Injustice Inequality	Rule of Law Rule of Law	
	Anti-corruption measures	(+) Anti-Corruption Programs (2)	Exploitation	Rule of Law	
		(+) Promoting public accountability by denouncing corruption (4)	Exploitation	Rule of Law	
		(+/-) Auditing (2)	Exploitation	Rule of Law	
		(-) Corporate Complicity in corrupt practices (11)	Exploitation	Rule of Law	
	Lobbying /political CSR	(+) Collective advocacy (2)	Social Injustice	Track-two diplomacy	
		(+) Public-private collaboration (1)	Social Injustice	Partnerships	
	Engaging in peace negotiations	(-) Complying with Criminal Economic Control (3) (+) Engaging governmental authorities for protection (2)	Social Injustice Social Injustice	Track-two diplomacy Track-two diplomacy	
	Shaping societal norms	(+) Normative Corporate Campaigns (2)	Social Injustice	Social Cohesion	
	Opportunities via trade policies	(+) Strengthening Organizational Resilience (1)	Exploitation	Economic Development	
Markets	Market and infrastructure	(+) Public-Private Infrastructure Development (2)	Social Injustice	Partnerships	
		(+) Investing in underserved regions (2)	Social Injustice	Economic Development	
		(-) Neglecting Security in Infrastructure development (1)	Social Injustice	Partnerships	
		(-) Neglecting marginalized regions (1)	Social Injustice	Economic Development	
	Enabling investments Advancing ecological infrastructure	(+) Eco-Innovation (2)	Social injustice	Partnerships	
Communities	Providing goods and services	(+) Community Development Programs (1) (+) Providing healthcare in conflict regions (3) (-) Denial of Health Access through Informal Labor Practices (4) (-) Extractive Development Undermining Community Resources (2)	Social injustice Social injustice Exploitation Social injustice	Partnerships Economic Development Economic Development Economic Development	
		Philanthropy/ CSR	(+) General Charitable Donations (5) (+) Partnering with NGOs (2) (+) Promoting CSR (3)	Social injustice Social injustice Social injustice	Economic Development Economic Development Partnerships
			Promoting communal interactions	(+) Educational and University Engagement (2) (+) Inclusion Networks (4) (+) Due Diligence (2)	Inequality Inequality Exploitation
		Conflict-sensitive governance		(+) Employee & Operational Safety (9) (+/-) Infrastructure Security (2) (+) Operational Restrictions (6) (-) Informal Response (3)	Social injustice Social injustice Social injustice Social injustice

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Employees	Collaborative industry networks	(-) Unjust dismissal practices (1)	Social injustice	Rule of Law
		(+/-) Private Security Responses (8)	Social injustice	Rule of Law
		(-) Operational relocation due to insecurity (3)	Social injustice	Rule of Law
		(+/-) Strategic withdrawal for Risk Mitigation (3)	Social injustice	Capacity building
		(+) Cross-sector collaboration (3)	Social injustice	Rule of Law
	Inclusive economic relationships	(+) Employing local workforce (1)	Social Injustice	Economic Development
	Defunding conflict actors	(-) Adhering to extortion demands (3)	Exploitation	Economic development
		(+) Managing Extortion Risks (1)	Exploitation	Partnerships
		(-) Underpayment and Compensation Disparities (3)	Exploitation	Social Cohesion
		(+) Fair Compensation (2)	Exploitation	Rule of Law
		(+) Gender Equity and Inclusion (3)	Inequality	Rule of Law
	Sustainable Livelihood	(+) Work-Life and Family Support (1)	Inequality	Economic Development
		(-) Neglecting Inclusive Work-Family Support (1)	Inequality	Economic Development
		(+) Benefits and Wellbeing (1)	Social Injustice	Social Cohesion
		(+/-) Bypassing Public Health Systems (1)	Social Injustice	Social Cohesion
		(+) Using Inclusive Hiring to Foster Organizational Change (2)	Inequality	Social Cohesion
	Capacity Building	(-) Neglecting Decent Work Access in High-Risk Contexts (1)	Inequality	Economic Development
		(+) Security and Safe Access (4)	Social Injustice	Economic Development
		(+) General Skills and Values Training (2)	Social Injustice	Economic Development
		(+) Risk Training (1)	Social Injustice	Economic Development
		(+) Modeling ethical behavior and integrity (4)	Exploitation	Social Cohesion
	Employee Socialization	(+) Promoting intergroup inclusion (8)	Inequality	Capacity Building
		(+) Cultivating Inclusive Workplace Culture (6)	Inequality	Capacity Building
		(+) Organizing Employee Social Events (3)	Inequality	Capacity Building
	Personal Transformation	(+) Practicing Inclusive Leadership (4)	Inequality	Social Cohesion
		(+) Promoting family integration in the workplace (2)	Social Injustice	Social Cohesion
		(+) Empowering employees (6)	Social Injustice	Social Cohesion

Table 4. Coding Scheme of Structural Violence Characteristics

SV Characteristic	Definition	Examples	Coding Rules
SV1: Inequality	Inequality leads to unequal life chances, limiting certain groups' access to valued resources and services advocates for relatively equitable distribution of benefits and detriments unaffected by these structural factors (Blackburn, 2008). Disparities across social groups based on race, class, gender, religion (Blackburn, 2008)	“We don’t have one single female director“ (P16); “Because here in Mexico, one of the things about violence is the violence in women” (P24); “We don’t have one single female (P18); “As a society, we feel divided that people with brown skin color are low level workers or they are inferior and they don’t deserve these opportunities. It is changing but it is still a very big problem” (P3).	Keywords: race, class, gender, religion or similar characteristics are mentioned, it is classified under “inequality”
SV2: Social Injustice	It entails equitable treatment, support for human rights, and fair resource allocation (Caravelis & Robinson, 2015). Disparities in education, employment, wealth distribution, health, and rights related to climate and land.	“the limited level of education in the schools” (P24); “If working people can’t afford to live or educate their children, what do you think will happen? Criminal organizations will step in and employ them. They might be the biggest employer in Mexico because legitimate companies don’t provide enough opportunities” (P25).	Keywords: education, employment, wealth distribution, health, human rights or similar characteristics are mentioned, it is classified under “social injustice”
SV3: Exploitation	It occurs when individuals or groups are unfairly taken advantage of (Zwolinski, 2011), often benefiting the exploiter and limiting victims' choices, especially within systems of unequal power distribution that disadvantage those with less power (Ho, 2007);	“It’s very common for companies to focus only on high-ranking managers, disregarding those who perform the actual work” (P10); “People work and are still poor. It’s work poverty. You earn so little that it’s very easy to be drawn into criminal activities” (P26); “Companies do not care about their employees. (...) In this way people are very used to super low salaries and super high working days and time“ (P10)	Keywords: unfair labor practices, inadequate wages, poor working conditions, and corruption; as well as unequal power and limiting choices

Table 5. Coding scheme of primary data including the SV interpretive reasoning effect.

Domain	Category	Activity	SV	SV Effect Reasoning	B4P
Institutions	Upholding legal norms	(+) Internal Compliance Systems (11)	Social Injustice	Establishes non-violence norms and reinforces safety and legal conformity for stakeholders and rightsholders	Rule of Law
		(-) Undermining complying with tax obligations (2)	Inequality	Reinforces a dual system where formal protections are only accessible to the privileged.	Rule of Law
		(+) Anti-Corruption Programs (2)	Exploitation	Promotes awareness of rights and rules, reinforcing transparency and civic protection	Rule of Law
	Anti-corruption measures	(+) Promoting public accountability by denouncing corruption (4)	Exploitation	Challenges systemic corruption and strengthens public integrity and institutional accountability.	Rule of Law
		(+/-) Auditing (2)	Exploitation	Creates formal controls but lacks consistent enforcement, allowing some corruption to persist.	Rule of Law
		(-) Corporate Complicity in corrupt practices (11)	Exploitation	Normalizes and perpetuates corrupt systems that disproportionately harm those without access to power or influence.	Rule of Law
		(+) Collective advocacy (2)	Social Injustice	Organizing with other firms to oppose and addresses unequal influence by countering the structural impunity of political elites.	Track-two diplomacy
	Lobbying /political CSR	(+) Public-private collaboration (1)	Social Injustice	Promotes cooperative problem-solving between state and private actors, addressing systemic deficits.	Partnerships
		(-) Complying with Criminal Economic Control (3)	Social Injustice	Territorial control by violent actors deprives businesses of autonomy and security; pure economic coercion; Explains criminal economic control; not a peacebuilding activity	Track-two diplomacy
	Engaging in peace negotiations	(+) Engaging governmental authorities for protection (2)	Social Injustice	Attempts to strengthen institutional protection mechanisms where state support is weak.	Track-two diplomacy
Markets	Shaping societal norms	(+) Normative Corporate Campaigns (2)	Social Injustice	Promotes global justice values and equal rights	Social Cohesion
	Opportunities via trade policies	(+) Strengthening Organizational Resilience (1)	Exploitation	Highlights unequal business conditions where insecurity imposes additional operational burdens in structurally violent settings.	Economic Development
		(+) Public-Private Infrastructure Development (2)	Social Injustice	Promotes shared prosperity in underserved regions; enables equal access to economic opportunity	Partnerships
	Market and infrastructure	(+) Investing in underserved regions (2)	Social Injustice	Highlights the unequal distribution of public goods like connectivity, which restricts opportunity and deepens insecurity.	Economic Development

Communities	Enabling investments	(-) Neglecting Security in Infrastructure development (1)	Social Injustice	Contextual observation of state failure to prioritize security	Partnerships
		(-) Neglecting marginalized regions (1)	Social Injustice	Lack of industrial presence reinforces regional marginalization and unequal life chances.	Economic Development
		(+) Eco-Innovation (2)	Social injustice	Addresses environmental degradation and builds capacity and environmental awareness.	Partnerships
	Advancing ecological infrastructure	(+) Community Development Programs (1)	Social injustice	Temporary relief to vulnerable communities, particularly in disasters	Partnerships
		(+) Providing healthcare in conflict regions (3)	Social injustice	Ensures access to life-saving medication in conflict zones where infrastructure fails	Economic Development
		(-) Denial of Health Access through Informal Labor Practices (4)	Exploitation	Business chooses not to register workers, denying them access to healthcare and social protection	Economic Development
	Providing goods and services	(-) Extractive Development Undermining Community Resources (2)	Social injustice	Depleting community resources for corporate benefit exacerbates inequality and community harm.	Economic Development
		(+) General Charitable Donations (5)	Social injustice	Responds to emergencies that disproportionately affect vulnerable groups	Economic Development
		(+) Partnering with NGOs (2)	Social injustice	Supporting NGOs that promotes equitable wellbeing and inclusion through external partnerships.	Economic Development
	Philanthropy/ CSR	(+) Promoting CSR (3)	Social injustice	Combines short-term aid with empowerment to reduce future disadvantage	Partnerships
		(+) Educational and University Engagement (2)	Inequality	Expands access to career preparation and social mobility for young professionals.	Social Cohesion
		(+) Inclusion Networks (4)	Inequality	Promotes recognition and inclusion, addressing systemic exclusion	Partnerships
	Promoting communal interactions	(+) Due Diligence (2)	Exploitation	Avoids supporting suppliers involved in unethical or harmful practices, reducing exploitative dynamics.	Social Cohesion
		(+) Employee & Operational Safety (9)	Social injustice	Offers security education and preparedness to reduce vulnerability of workers in violent contexts.	Capacity Training
		(+/-) Infrastructure Security (2)	Social injustice	Builds private security infrastructure but does not address systemic violence or institutional failure.	Economic Development
	Conflict-sensitive governance	(+) Operational Restrictions (6)	Social injustice	Protective governance of labor conditions, recognizing uneven security realities and adapting work to support safety and life.	Rule of Law
	Operations				

			(-) Informal Response (3)	Social injustice	Undermines trust in institutions and reinforces cycles of impunity and informal retaliation.	Capacity building
			(-) Unjust dismissal practices (1)	Social injustice	Zero-tolerance dismissal without investigation risks injustice and undermines trust in institutional fairness.	Rule of Law
			(+/-) Private Security Responses (8)	Social injustice	While it can temporarily increase safety, it reflects systemic failure of public safety and unequal access to security.	Rule of Law
			(-) Operational relocation due to insecurity (3)	Social injustice	This reinforces uneven regional development and denies residents access to dignified economic participation—deepening structural injustices.	Rule of Law
			(+/-) Strategic withdrawal for Risk Mitigation (3)	Social injustice	Withdrawing reduces immediate risk but reinforces regional economic disparity and leaves vulnerable groups exposed to danger.	Capacity building
		Collaborative industry networks	(+) Cross-sector collaboration (3)	Social injustice	Building alliances increases capacity to resist conflict actor pressure and fosters collective security and fairness.	Rule of Law
		Inclusive economic relationships	(+) Employing local workforce (1)	Social Injustice	Empowers local stakeholders	Economic Development
		Defunding conflict actors	(-) Adhering to extortion demands (3)	Exploitation	Supports violent groups through financial compliance.	Economic development
			(+) Managing Extortion Risks (1)	Exploitation	Refusing to financially support violent actors limits exploitation of business as a revenue stream for crime.	Partnerships
			(-) Underpayment and Compensation Disparities (3)	Exploitation	Systemic labor exploitation, prioritizing profit, and disregard for human dignity.	Social Cohesion
			(+) Fair Compensation (2)	Exploitation	Paying fair wages and providing benefits	Rule of Law
			(+) Gender Equity and Inclusion (3)	Inequality	Promotes labor market inclusion and disrupts gendered barriers to economic advancement.	Rule of Law
			(+) Work-Life and Family Support (1)	Inequality	Tackles unequal access to childcare and supports work-life balance, enabling parents—especially women—to participate in the labor force.	Economic Development
Employees	Sustainable Livelihood		(-) Neglecting Inclusive Work-Family Support (1)	Inequality	Excludes women from workforce participation and advancement due to structural caregiving burdens.	Economic Development
			(+) Benefits and Wellbeing (1)	Social Injustice	Directly supports access to basic needs, reducing disparities in nutritional security.	Social Cohesion
			(+/-) Bypassing Public Health Systems (1)	Social Injustice	While the measure increases healthcare access for individual employees, it circumvents public health infrastructure, reinforcing broader inequality and undermining systemic justice	Social Cohesion

Capacity Building	(+) Using Inclusive Hiring to Foster Organizational Change (2)	Inequality	Promotes labor market inclusion	Social Cohesion
	(-) Neglecting Decent Work Access in High-Risk Contexts (1)	Inequality	Pushes people toward illicit economies	Economic Development
	(+) Security and Safe Access (4)	Social Injustice	Enhances employee safety in high-risk zones.	Economic Development
	(+) General Skills and Values Training (2)	Social Injustice	Promotes general skills and values training	Economic Development
	(+) Risk Training (1)	Social Injustice	Promotes equal access to practical knowledge on violence prevention, enhancing community safety.	Economic Development
	(+) Modeling ethical behavior and integrity (4)	Exploitation	Models ethical behavior and creates workplace cultures that foster psychological safety.	Social Cohesion
	(+) Promoting intergroup inclusion (8)	Inequality	Creating inclusive and respectful environments mitigates internal marginalization and enhances ethical practice.	Capacity Building
	(+) Cultivating Inclusive Workplace Culture (6)	Inequality	Fosters dignity and shared purpose, countering alienation and workplace disempowerment. Strengthens organizational trust.	Capacity Building
	(+) Organizing Employee Social Events (3)	Inequality	Promotes positive interpersonal relations and strengthens workplace solidarity.	Capacity Building
	(+) Practicing Inclusive Leadership (4)	Inequality	Reinforces dignity and inclusion through empathetic leadership.	Social Cohesion
Personal Transformation	(+) Promoting family integration in the workplace (2)	Social Injustice	Supports work-life balance and affirms family wellbeing, creating conditions for dignity and emotional stability.	Social Cohesion
	(+) Empowering employees (6)	Social Injustice	Encourages personal growth and reduces dependency on rigid roles. Fosters workplace dignity	Social Cohesion

Table 6. The B4P Strategies

B4P Strategies	Definition	Examples	Coding Rules
Social Cohesion	Fostering trust, reciprocity, and strong social bonds within local communities, thereby contributing to peacebuilding efforts (Jenson, 2010).	“Also in the neighborhood (...) the kids are drinking in the streets and stuff like that. We try to promote by having some incentives for them to play football or have leisure activities that are not just drinking and having free time.” (P11).	Keywords: community, collective, integration, working together, support, building trust, cooperation between groups, inclusivity, engagement, sense of belonging, shared responsibility
Capacity Building	It involves businesses developing the capabilities of various actors both within and outside the company through activities like employee training, stakeholder engagement, and leveraging expertise (Katsos & AlKafaji, 2019).	“I try to be really flexible with personal stuff. If someone has to go to the doctor or if someone has to be with their parents or partners, or their dogs, I’m really empathetic with these things” (P22).	Keywords: capacity building, skills development, capabilities, growth, development, training programs, knowledge transfer, workshops and seminars, skills improvement, investing in human resources, enhance operations
Economic Development	As business activities generate economic benefits like profit, social welfare, and employment, which can reduce poverty and mitigate conflict (Joseph et al., 2020; Haggard & Tiede, 2011).	“And for us as a company, it’s easier to pay them a full salary without any tax and they are happier because; why [would] they want to pay taxes for medical care. The medical system here in Mexico is really, really bad” (P12);	Keywords: economic development, business growth, market expansion, job opportunities, employment, workforce, business investment, revenue growth, financial sustainability, supply chains
Rule of Law	In the absence of effective state legal frameworks, businesses can promote peace by upholding rule of law principles, adopting international norms and enforcement mechanisms (Oetzel et al., 2009).	“This [certification] (...) [supports the] prevention of money laundering by training [companies]. To prevent bribery, you have to do it” (P26).	Keywords: rule of law, legal compliance, regulatory adherence, corporate governance, ethical business practices, anti-corruption policies, transparency and accountability, compliance, legal risk, fair labor, due diligence.
Track-two diplomacy	It focuses on unofficial, informal interactions between businesses and conflicting parties (Lieberfeld, 2002; Westermann-Behaylo, 2010).	“There was a news that organized crime took a vineyard and they closed it because the owner didn’t want to pay them for that illegal fee. So the whole industry united and supported that vineyard. After that (...) they did actions to liberate that vineyard and resolve the problem” (P18).	Keywords: track-two diplomacy, informal diplomacy, conflict resolution, mediation efforts, business-led negotiations, facilitating negotiations, corporate diplomacy
Partnerships	Partnerships with local stakeholders and institutions offer an alternative to traditional development aid, allowing businesses to collaborate across sectors (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Baur & Palazzo, 2011).	“Providing chats or some conferences in Universities in order to get women to [join our team]” (P24).	Keywords: partnerships, collaborations, strategic alliances, multi-stakeholder engagement, joint initiatives, public-private partnerships, NGOs, networks, cooperation, CSR, industry initiatives